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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL 
v. MARSH: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
ESTABLISHES A POTENT STANDARD FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh,! the Ninth 
Circuit held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS) relating to construction of 
the proposed Elk Creek Dam failed to satisfy the requirements 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 In reversing 
the denial of injunctive relief, the court agreed with plaintiffs' 
contentions that the EIS was insufficient due to the Corps' fail-
ure to specify and analyze techniques mitigating the adverse en-
vironmental impacts of the project.s Further, the court held that 
the Corps must (1) prepare a new supplemental EIS addressing 
new information obtained regarding the environmental impact 
of the project,' (2) prepare a worst case analysis or conduct fur-
ther research on the issue of waterflow from Elk Creek,c> and (3) 
address the cumulative impact of Elk Creek Dam in conjunction 
with two other nearby existing dams.6 
1. 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Norris, J., and Wallace, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
3. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Plaintiffs are Oregon Natural Resources Council, Oregon Guides and Packers Assn., Inc., 
Rogue Flyfishers, Inc., and Rogue River Guides Assn., nonprofit groups claiming injury 
by the dam's construction. [d. at 1054 n.2. 
4. [d. at 1058. 
5. [d. at 1059. 
6. [d. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings regarding the 
placement of opposing views in the EIS, the Corps' discussion of conflicts between the 
proposed Elk Creek Dam and competing federal policies, and the adequacy of the cost-
153 
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II. FACTS 
The Rogue River, into which Elk Creek flows, is located in 
southwestern Oregon. The Rogue is one of eight rivers desig-
nated as "wild and scenic" by the U.S. Congress,7 and its fishing 
and white water recreation are of national repute.s In 1962, Con-
gress authorized construction of Elk Creek Dam, Applegate 
River Dam, and Lost Creek Dam to control flooding in the 
Rogue River Basin.9 The Applegate River and Lost Creek dams 
have since been completed.1o 
In 1971, the Corps completed the final EIS on the Elk Creek 
project.ll In 1975, the Corps drafted a supplemental EIS after 
studying the projected impact of the dam on turbidityl2 in the 
Rogue River.ls In 1980, after completing additional turbidity 
and temperature projections, the Corps filed a revised draft sup-
plemental EIS.14 These analyses generated much criticism by 
state and federal agencies. lII The Corps placed these comments 
and its responses to them in a separate section of its final sup-
plemental EIS.16 
In August, 1985, although funding was not sought by the 
Corps,17 Congress appropriated funds and directed the Corps to 
benefit analysis employed. Id. at 1060-6!. 
7. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1053-54 (citing Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C_ § 1271 
(1982». 
8. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. 
9.Id. 
10.Id. 
11. Id. The Elk Creek project, as proposed, includes a concrete dam 249 feet high 
and 2,580 feet long. Id. The reservoir created will cover approximately 1,290 acres of 
land.ld. 
12. Id. "Turbidity" is defined by the Corps as "an expression of the optical property 
of water which causes light to be scattered and absorbed rather than transmitted 
through in straight lines ... [which) is caused by suspended matter." Id. at 1054 n.!. 
"Simply stated, turbidity is murkiness due to stirred-up sediment." Id. 
13. Id. at 1054. During this period, the Governor of Oregon withdrew state support 
for the project and requested that work be suspended until its effect on water quality in 
the Rogue could be evaluated. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 
1557, 1561 (D. Or. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987). 
14. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. Projections were based on observations at Lost Creek 
Dam in 1977 and simulated models. Id. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102. 
16. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. 
17. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 1557, 1561 (D. Or. 
1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987). Despite the Corps' issuance of a Record of 
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begin construction of Elk Creek Dam.Is Shortly thereafter, 
plaintiffs brought this action in federal district court to enjoin 
construction of the project.I9 The district court held that the 
Corps' preparation of the EIS satisfied NEP A requirements and 
denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.20 
III. BACKGROUND 
In introducing the National Environmental Policy Act, Con-
gress broadly declared its intent to encourage harmony with, and 
prevent damage to the environment.21 NEPA directs all federal 
agencies to consider environmental issues "to the fullest extent 
possible," during the planning and implementation of proposed 
actions.22 NEP A also established the Council of Environmental 
Quality (CEQ),23 which issues regulations implementing NEPA's 
procedural requirements.24 
Decision, water quality data, an Environmental Assessment, and Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact (all in support of proceeding with the project), the Corps did not seek Con-
gressional funding. Id. Plaintiffs assert that the Corps' uncharacteristic failure to seek 
funding was caused by its prior opposition to the Elk Creek project. Oregon Natural 
Resources Council, White Paper 7-8 (August 23, 1987). 
18. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. at 1561. 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 1568-69. The court concluded that the Corps satisfied its obligations under 
NEP A since it took a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the proposed 
dam.ld. 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). Congress further described its intent "[t]o declare a 
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man 
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment ... [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural 
resources important to the Nation .... " Id. Congress enumerated several intended goals 
such as the recognition of the populace as trustee of the environment for future genera-
tions, and the preservation of important historic, cultural and natural resources. 42 
U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1982). For a discussion of the legislative history and intent of NEPA, 
see W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.1 (1977) [hereinafter W. ROD-
GERS], and Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? -An Analysis of the Historical Development 
and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 557 (1984) [hereinafter MURCHISON]. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). NEPA's requirements are subordinate to an 
agency's conflicting obligations arising under other statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1982). See 
also MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 559. 
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982). 
24. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1986). See generally MURCHISON, supra note 20, at 589. 
The CEQ's initial advisory role was enhanced by President Carter's executive order au-
thori2ing CEQ's promulgation of environmental guidelines binding on federal agencies. 
Id. CEQ regulations are binding on federal agencies and entitled to substantial deference 
by the courts. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). 
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The key provision enacted to attain Congress' environmen-
tal objectives requires federal agencies to include an EIS with 
every proposal for major federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment.25 The primary purposes 
of an EIS are to foster both informed decision-making and in-
formed public participation in light of the environmental conse-
quences of a proposed project.26 An agency's obligations under 
NEPA are generally considered to be satisfied upon the prepara-
tion and circulation of an EIS which demonstrates that a pro-
ject's environmental impact has been fully evaluated.27 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION-THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK § 2.21 (1981 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter F. SKILLERN] (the 
role of the EIS in the decisionmaking process is to assure the protection of the public 
interest); see also D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY ACT § 1:01 (1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter D. MANDELKER]. 
An Environmental Impact Statement is defined as a detailed statement of the re-
sponsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should 
it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
26. Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Better Henderson upheld an EIS for construction of power transmission lines within city 
limits. Id. at 1057. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1986) (CEQ's view of the purpose of an 
EIS). 
27. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which severely limited the scope of judicial review of agency 
decisions under NEP A. Reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, the Supreme Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure to 
address energy conservation as an alternative to the construction of a nuclear power 
plant did not invalidate its EIS. Id. at 552-53. "NEPA does set forth significant substan-
tive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Id. 
at 558 (emphasis added). See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) 
(in reviewing agency action, the court's only role is to insure that the agency has taken a 
"hard look" at the environmental consequences). See infra notes 75-78 and accompany-
ing text. See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, at 21 (favorable view of NEP A's 
significance). But cf. MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 603 (articulating a skeptical view of 
NEPA's significance for environmental protection). 
CEQ's view of NEP A's purpose states: "NEP A procedures must insure that environ-
mental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made 
and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate scien-
tific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing 
NEPA." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1986). 
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS under NEP A, the 
Ninth Circuit applies a "rule of reason," the standard generally 
recognized in the federal courts.28 For example, in Enos v. 
Marsh,29 the court reviewed the sufficiency of the Corps of Engi-
neers' EIS discussion of the secondary environmental effects of 
its proposed deep draft harbor project.30 Applying the "rule of 
reason," the court described its task as to determine "whether 
an EIS contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the signifi-
cant aspects of the probable environmental consequences,"31 
thereby fostering informed decision-making and public partici-
pation.32 The court held that the EIS adequately alerted deci-
28. See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985), discussed infra notes 29-
34 and accompanying text; Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 
1984) ("rule of reason" applied to determine adequacy of transportation department's 
EIS), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985), discussed infra notes 47-52 and accompanying 
text; California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) ("rule of reason" applied to 
determine adequacy of Forest Service EIS). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, at 
§ 2.39. 
The Second Circuit also employs a "rule of reason" in reviewing the sufficiency of 
the contents of an EIS. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 
F.2d lOll, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1983). The court applied a "rule of reason" in evaluating the 
Corps' EIS for a highway and urban renewal project. Id. By its inclusion of false state-
ments regarding the aquatic impact of the project and omission of impact on fisheries, 
the court found that the EIS did not adequately compile relevant information on the 
project. Id. In Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700 (11th 
Cir. 1985), the Eleventh Circuit applied a "rule of reason" to assess the contents of a 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) EIS supporting construction of the Presiden-
tial Parkway in Atlanta. Id. at 708-09. Upon review of the plaintiffs' claims disputing the 
FHWA's traffic and safety data, the court held that they failed to demonstrate the sub-
stantial procedural flaws necessary to invalidate the EIS. Id. at 712. 
In Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit 
rejected plaintiffs' challenges of the adequacy of a highway administration EIS for high-
way construction through a New Jersey park. Id. at 442. Rather than applying a "rule of 
reason," the court applied the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard by 
shifting the focus of the inquiry from adequacy of the EIS's contents to the agency's 
substantive decision to go forward with the project. Id. at 441. Based on the district 
court's analysis and substantial volume of the EIS, the agency action was neither arbi-
trary nor capricious. Id. at 442. 
29. 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). 
30. Id. at 1371. 
31. Id. at 1372 (citing California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982». 
32. Enos, 769 F.2d at 1372. Judicial authority to review agency decisions is pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982), empowering courts to 
set aside agency actions taken without observance of procedures required by law. Id. 
This circuitous source of authority is necessary because Congress failed to provide any 
enforcement mechanism within NEP A. See MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 562. 
While a "rule of reason" is employed in the review of agency decisions, district court 
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sion-makers and the public to potential secondary effects of the 
project, and that further analysis was not required.33 The court 
reasoned that the EIS's brief references to the harbor project's 
impact on population growth, urbanization, and pollution, 
though potentially "far reaching," were sufficient, since such 
consequences were speculative and dependent on local develop-
ment decisions.34 
B. ADEQUACY OF AN EIS' MITIGATION PLAN 
CEQ requlations require that an EIS include a discussion of 
"[m]eans to mitigate adverse environmental impacts .... "35 The 
Ninth Circuit requires that an EIS include an analysis and eval-
uation of measures to be employed to mitigate the adverse ef': 
fects of the project.36 
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. 
Peterson,37 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a Forest Service plan to 
permit timber harvesting and road construction in a portion of 
Six Rivers National Forest considered sacred by Indians in the 
area.38 The court held that the EIS's discussion, which neither 
analyzed nor explained the effectiveness of mitigation measures 
planned, was insufficient to ensure the level of informed deci-
decisions are reviewed to determine whether they are grounded upon an erroneous legal 
standard or upon clearly erroneous findings of fact. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 
1442, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). See infra notes 47-52 
and accompanying text. 
33. Enos, 769 F.2d at 1373. 
34.Id. 
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1986). 
36. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588 (9th 
Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other grounds, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), 
cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 
1971 (1987). Complete compensation for adverse impacts is not required as long as sig-
nificant mitigation measures are undertaken. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. 
Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit upheld a U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service decision not to prepare an EIS despite the project's impact on an "en-
dangered species." Id. at 988-89. One factor supporting the court's decision was the en-
hancement of survival of the Mission Blue Butterfly due to mitigation measures adopted. 
Id. at 987. 
37. 764 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other 
grounds, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987). 
38. Id. at 583. 
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sion-making contemplated by NEPA.39 
In Trout Unlimited v. Morton,40 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered challenges to the Bureau of Reclamation's ErS for construc-
tion of the Teton Dam and reservoir.41 The court held that the 
Bureau's ErS discussion of mitigation measures, organized under 
eight headings, was adequate though conceding that it could 
have been more extensive.42 The court stated that the Bureau's 
issuance of an elaborate mitigation plan for wildlife after filing 
of the final ErS "suggested" that the ErS was adequate to in-
form decision-makers.43 
C. DUTY TO SUPPLEMENT ErS 
CEQ regulations require that federal agencies supplement 
an ErS when significant new information is acquired or new cir-
cumstances develop, relevant to the environmental impact of a 
proposed action.44 The Ninth Circuit expands on this theme by 
finding a continuing duty by federal agencies to gather and eval-
uate new information relevant to the environmental impact of 
its actions after the issuance of its ErS.41S However, reasonable 
agency decisions not to supplement an ErS in light of new infor-
mation will be upheld.46 
39. [d. at 588 (citing Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982». See also 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1972) (EIS for 
river channeli2ation project which did not contain specific mitigation plan nor a discus-
sion of alternative of acquiring land to mitigate loss of natural resources was held inade-
quate even though this alternative involved a separate project requiring separate Con-
gressional authorization); Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181, 1186-
87 (D.D.C. 1975) (EIS for relocation of naval oceanographic center which did not con-
sider mitigation measures regarding the impact on housing and education in the affected 
community was held inadequate). See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:17; 
and MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 608-09 (CEQ regulations such as mitigation provisions 
may provide important basis for environmental challenges, even though they may exceed 
scope of NEPA's statutory framework). 
40. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974). 
41. [d. at 1281. 
42. [d. at 1284. 
43. [d. 
44. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1986). 
45. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463 (9th Cir. 1984). "When new infor-
mation comes to light the agency must consider it, evaluate it, and make a reasoned 
determination whether it is of such significance as to require implementation of formal 
NEPA filing requirements." [d. at 1463-64. 
46. [d. at 1463. In Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), 
discussed supra note 28, the Third Circuit held that new information dealing with the 
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In Stop H-3 Association v. Dole;" the Ninth Circuit identi-
fied four factors for determining the reasonableness of an 
agency's decision not to supplement its EIS.48 Reasonableness 
depends on (1) the environmental significance of the new infor-
mation, (2) the probable accuracy of the information, (3) the de-
gree of care with which the agency considered and evaluated the 
information, and (4) the degree to which the agency supported 
its decision not to supplement the EIS.49 
In Stop H-3, the court reviewed a transportation depart-
ment decision not to supplement its EIS for a proposed exten-
sion of interstate highway with allegedly new and significant 
population data.50 The court concluded that information devel-
oped from 1978 Hawaii state population projections did not re-
quire supplementation since the changes were not significantly 
different from the population ranges discussed in the EIS.51 Fur-
thermore, the court considered that data revealed by the 1980 
census was not shown to be so environmentally significant as to 
require supplementation even though population growth in the 
area to be served by the project exceeded local planning 
objectives. 52 
In Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,53 the Ninth 
Circuit considered claims that the Corps of Engineers improp-
erly failed to supplement the EIS for the construction of Warm 
traffic, noise, and air quality impacts of the project, included in the final EIS after circu-
lation of the draft EIS did not violate NEPA. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). In Wisconsin 
v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit treated a Navy decision 
not to supplement the EIS with new information dealing with the biological effects of its 
submarine communications project as a decision not to issue an EIS at all. Id. at 417. By 
this approach, the court was able to apply the more deferential "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard to the Navy's action, facilitating its decision that NEPA was not vio-
lated. Id. at 424. The court held that a supplementary EIS was not required unless the 
new information presented "a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape 
such that another hard look is necessary." Id. at 418 (emphasis in original). See gener-
ally F. SKILLERN, supra note 25, § 2.48A; D. MANnELKER, supra note 25, §§ 10:43-10:45. 
47. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). 
48. Id. at 1464. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1463-64. 
51. Id at 1464-65. 
52. Id. at 1465. Furthermore, the court stated that the transportation agency's con-
currence in the EIS was conditioned on recognition of an obligation to cooperate with 
local agencies' planning goals. Id. 
53. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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Springs Dam.1I4 The plaintiffs argued that new information be-
came available which suggested that the ErS underestimated the 
force of potential earthquake activity in the area.1I1I The court 
concluded that this information was significant because it sug-
gested that the dam, as designed, might not withstand such seis-
mic activity.t16 The court, how~ver, questioned the accuracy of 
the newly acquired information, which also failed to supply data 
indicating the strength of potential earthquakes.1I7 The court de-
termined that the Corps' decision not to supplement the ErS in 
light of this information was unreasonable at the time. lls How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Corps' failure was 
cured by studies undertaken subsequent to trial which reaf-
firmed the seismic data presented in the ErS.1I9 On the basis of 
this, most recent information, the Corps' decision not to supple-
ment the ErS to address the information at issue in this case 
was deemed reasonable.60 
D. REQUIREMENT OF WORST CASE ANALYSIS 
CEQ regulations in effect during the planning stages of the 
Elk Creek Dam required that when an agency was uncertain or 
lacked information as to the adverse environmental effects of its 
actions, it must make clear, in the ErS, that such uncertainty 
existed.61 If information is lacking that is essential to a reasoned 
choice and the cost of obtaining it is not exorbitant, the agency 
must obtain the information and include it in the statement or 
include a worst case analysis.62 
In Sierra Club v. Sigler,63 the Fifth Circuit interpreted the 
CEQ's worst case requirement in a case where the Corps pro-
posed the construction of oil pipelines and a tanker superport in 
54. Id. at 1023. 
55.Id. 
56. Id. at 1025. 
57. Id. The court considered the new information more significant for the questions 
it raised rather than the answers it provided. Id. 
58.Id. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 1026. 
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (subsequently amended April 25, 1986). 
62.Id. 
63. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
9
Wesser: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
162 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:153 
Galveston Bay.64 The plaintiffs contended that the EIS was in-
adequate since it did not include a worst case analysis of a cata-
strophic oil spill.65 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the purpose 
of the worst case requirement is to disclose to the decision-mak-
ers all known potential environmental consequences of an 
agency action.66 The court held that the EIS must analyze the 
probability of such a spill, rejecting the Corps' arguments that 
such a scenario was unreasonably speculative.67 
In Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,68 the Ninth Circuit ,held 
that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) worst case anal-
ysis for its herbicide spraying program was inadequate.69 The 
court noted that the CEQ's worst case requirement was not new, 
but rather a codification of prior case law which required analy-
sis of the costs of proceeding with a project absent relevant in-
formation.70 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed the principle that 
when a project's environmental consequences are uncertain, dis-
closure of such uncertainty is insufficient.71 The court held that 
an analysis of the spectrum of possible events, including the 
worst case situation that cancer could be spread by implementa-
tion of its spraying program, was required.72 
E. CUMULATIVE IMPACT REQUIREMENT 
To further NEP A's objectives of promoting informed deci-
64. [d. at 968-75. 
65. [d. at 968. 
66. [d. at 973. 
67. [d. at 974-75. 
68. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). 
69. [d. at 1245-46. 
70. [d. at 1244 (citing Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 
720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984». See also 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1986) (requiring a similar analysis when a project's environmen-
tal risks are uncertain). 
71. Save Our Ecosystems, 747 F.2d at 1244. 
72. [d. at 1244-45. The court rejected the BLM's argument that a worst case analy-
sis was not required where the occurrence of such an event was not supported by scien-
tific data. [d. See also Southern Oregon Citizens, 720 F.2d at 1479 (worst case analysis 
requirement applied to Bureau of Land Management's proposed insect spraying program 
despite bureau's contention that a worst case event was improbable). But see Oregon 
EnvtL Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (agency's use of worst 
case analysis in EIS for gypsy moth eradication project upheld despite agency's failure to 
explicitly show cost of further study exorbitant). See generally F. SKILLERN, supra note 
25, § 2.50A; D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:17. 
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sion-making and public awareness of proposed federal actions, 
CEQ regulations require EIS discussion of the cumulative im-
pact of its proposed actions.73 " 'Cumulative impact' is the im-
pact on the environment which results from the incremental im-
pact of the action when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions .... "74 
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,75 the Supreme Court reviewed a 
District of Columbia Circuit decision ordering the federal gov-
ernment to prepare a comprehensive EIS analyzing coal devel-
opment in the northern Great Plains region of the United States 
prior to approving specific development permits.76 In reversing 
the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that analysis of the 
cumulative impact of regional development under consideration, 
was not required, unless such agency action was formally pro-
posed." However, the Court also noted that an agency could ap-
prove one project in an area where other projects are contem-
plated, and then take into consideration the environmental 
effects of the existing project when preparing a statement on the 
cumulative impact of the remaining proposals.78 
In Thomas v. Peterson,79 the Ninth Circuit reviewed chal-
lenges to the United States Forest Service's (Service) approval 
of timber harvesting and timber road construction in Idaho's na-
tional forests.8o The plaintiffs claimed that the Service violated 
NEPA by failing to issue an EIS addressing the cumulative envi-
ronmental impact of the road construction together with the 
planned timber harvest.81 The court explained that since the 
73. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1986) (specifying certain topics to be addressed in an 
EIS, including a project's direct and indirect environmental effects). 
74. 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.7 (1986). 
75. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
76. [d. at 408. 
77. [d. at 414-15. 
78. [d. at 414 n.26. See also Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1247 (5th Cir. 
1985) (Corps of Engineers' assessment of cumulative impact of proposed housing devel-
opment on fragile wetlands held inadequate since it failed to address numerous actions 
affecting the same area); and Prince George's County v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181, 
1186 (D.D.C. 1975), discussed supra note 39, (EIS prepared for transfer of naval oceano-
graphic program was held inadequate for failure to address cumulative impact of 
planned transfer of army and NASA personnel to same location). See generally F. SKIL-
LERN, supra note 25, § 2.35; D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, § 10:37. 
79. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985). 
80. [d. at 756. 
81. [d. at 757. 
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timber sales could not take place without the road construction, 
and the roads would not be necessary but for the timber sales, 
the projects were "connected actions" for purposes of the CEQ 
regulations.82 The court found that these actions were being 
planned contemporaneously and that together, they would sig-
nificantly impact Salmon River trout and salmon populations as 
well as the habitat of the endangered Rocky Mountain Gray 
Wolf.83 Due to the interdependency of these actions, and the ex-
tent of their combined environmental effects, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the Service must prepare an EIS addressing these 
issues.84 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh involved al-
leged violations of NEP A and related CEQ regulations regarding 
the adequacy of the Corps' final EIS for the proposed Elk Creek 
Dam. The court began its analysis by declaring its duty to apply 
a standard of reasonableness to agency decisions.85 
1. Adequacy of the Mitigation Plan 
The plaintiffs first argued that the mitigation plan for wild-
life violated NEP A and CEQ guidelines because the EIS failed 
to specifically analyze or evaluate the measures submitted.86 The 
court evaluated the Corps' mitigation plan in light of its func-
tion to enable informed judgments by decision-makers, and full 
disclosure of the environmental impact of a project.87 
The court emphasized that by January 1986, the mitigation 
plan for wildlife, published in 1980, had not yet been finalized.88 
The plan stated that measures to compensate for loss of wildlife 
82. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (1986). 
83. [d. at 759-60. 
84. [d. at 761. 
85. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1987). 
See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
86. [d. at 1055. 
87. [d. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
88. [d. 
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habitat would be developed, and would consist of management 
of selected lands to improve the quality of wildlife habitat.89 The 
court declared that this failure to complete the mitigation plan 
rendered its analysis or evaluation by decision-makers impossi-
ble.90 Furthermore, the court considered that the plan's use of 
general phrases such as "habitat manipulative techniques," and 
"habitat development measures," was inadequate without speci-
fication of the techniques contemplated.91 In addition, the EIS 
failed to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the measures 
presented.92 Based on these deficiencies, the court agreed with 
plaintiffs' contentions and held that the mitigation plan violated 
NEPA's requirements.93 
2. Duty to Supplement the EIS 
The next issue concerned whether the Corps' failure to sup-
plement its EIS after obtaining new information regarding the 
project's environmental effects, violated NEPA.94 The Ninth 
Circuit reiterated the applicable standard, to uphold such 
agency decisions if reasonable,911 and proceeded to apply the 
Stop H-3 Association v. Dole four-factor analysis.9B 
Two studies completed subsequent to the Corps' 1980 sup-
plemental EIS presented new information relevant to the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed Elk Creek Dam.97 The Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife (Department), in its study 
completed August 1985, found "that the project could result in 
decreased survivability of chinook salmon,98 higher turbidity,99 
89. Id. Mitigation measures were to be developed subsequent to studies undertaken 
at nearby Applegate River Dam. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. The court also concluded that the Corps' mitigation plan failed to satisfy 
CEQ guidelines. Id. 
94. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056. 
95. Id. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text. 
96. Id. (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985». Applying the Stop H-3 test, the court recognized that 
these factors were neither mandatory nor exclusive. Id. at 1056 n.3, (citing Warm Springs 
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1980». 
97. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056. These studies criticized the Corps' conclusions in sev-
eral respects. Id. at 1056-57. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
98. Id. at 1056. Based on observations of the impact of nearby Lost Creek Dam, 
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increased disease potential in fish,I°O and decreased prospects for 
lure- and fl.y~fishing."lOI The United States Soil Conservation 
Service study disclosed significant new turbidity information 
corroborating the Department study.l02 
Conceding that these findings were· not conclusive,103 the 
court was convinced that these studies presented legitimate en-
vironmental concerns regarding decreased fish survivability and 
increased downstream turbidity not previously available; and 
was therefore environmentally significant under Stop H_3.104 
Continuing with the Stop H-3 approach, the court applied 
the second factor regarding the probable accuracy of the infor-
mation obtained, and concluded that, at a minimum, some of 
this recently acquired information was "probably accurate."lOI) 
The court pointed out that although independent experts were 
critical of many of the Department's conclusions, there was 
agreement on significant portions. lOS . 
In addition, the Corps did not respond to significant con-
cerns presented by the studies such as increased turbidity 
caused by project related roadbuilding in the Elk Creek water-
shed.l07 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Corps failed 
to exercise the proper level of care required under the third Stop 
Department scientists believed that similar circumstances could result from construction 
and operation of Elk Creek Dam. Id. at 1056-57. Increased water temperatures caused by 
the release of warmer water could cause decreased survival of chinook salmon. Id. 
99. Id. at 1056. Department scientists believed that logging and road building asso-
ciated with the project would result in higher turbidity. Id. at 1056-57. 
100. Id. at 1056. Although chinook salmon mortality rates have decreased to near 
zero, Department scientists believe there may be a connection between water flow con-
trols and increased fish disease. Id. . 
101. Id. at 1056. Higher water flows in the Rogue could decrease fishing prospects. 
Id. at 1057. Furthermore, reduction of the Department's budget by the Corps made addi-
tional study impossible. Id. at 1057. 
102. Id. Soil content in the Elk Creek watershed was found to be different than that 
stated in the EIS, having a substantially greater turbidity potential. Id. 
103. Id. Department scientists recommended further study of fish survivability and 
turbidity before the dam is built. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. Based on a review of the experts' testimony and data, the court believed 
that at least some of this information was "probably accurate." Id. 
107. Id. at 1057-58. Further, the Corps failed to respond to study conclusions re-
garding fish mortality due to disease, and to increased erosion potential. Id. 
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H -3 factor .IOS 
Under the fourth Stop H-3 factor, the court determined 
that the Corps neglected to support its decision not to supple-
ment its EIS.l09 In the court's view, since this new information 
raised legitimate environmental concerns, the Corps should have 
considered the information and at least presented additional 
support as to why supplementation was not required.11o For 
these reasons, the majority held that the Corps must prepare a 
supplemental EIS to address the environmental impact of this 
new information. 11 I 
3. Worst Case Requirement 
The Ninth Circuit considered plaintiffs' contention that the 
Corps failed to satisfy the CEQ's "worst case" regulation.112 
They argued that the EIS revealed uncertainty regarding the 
amount of water flow Elk Creek contributed to the Rogue, di-
rectly affecting turbidity levels.113 Therefore, plaintiffs claimed 
that NEP A required further study on this issue or a worst case 
analysis to indicate the extent that turbidity resulting from Elk 
Creek dam would affect the Rogue.114 
The court noted that the Corps, in its supplemental EIS, 
acknowledged its uncertainty regarding Elk Creek's contribution 
to total water flow in the Rogue.111l However, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the district court's finding that disclosure of uncertainty 
in the EIS satisfied the worst case requirement.116 The court 
held that the Corps must do further research on the question of 
108.ld. 
109.ld. 
110. ld. When the Corps learned that the soil in the Elk Creek watershed contained 
sedimentation levels in excess of that reported in the EIS, it chose not to respond. ld. at 
1058. 
111. ld. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service officials believed that a new supplemental 
EIS should be prepared, based on possible decreased water storage needs. ld. at 1058 n.7. 
112. ld. at 1058. 
113. ld. at 1057-58. Water flow levels also affect fishing prospects. ld. at 1057,1060. 
114. ld. at 1058-59. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. 
115. ld. The Corps asserted that Elk Creek Dam would have little effect on temper-
ature and turbidity on the Rogue. ld. However, in response to Oregon Department of 
Fish and Wildlife criticism, the Corps conceded that Elk Creek could contribute up to 
25% of waterflow. ld. 
116. ld. at 1059. 
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water flow contribution from Elk Creak or prepare a worst case 
analysis.1l7 The majority118 added that the Corps' worst case re-
sponsibility also applied to the subsequently acquired informa-
tion which it must now address.lls 
4. Cumulative Impact Requirement 
The Ninth Circuit considered plaintiffs' contention that the 
Corps unreasonably limited the scope of the EIS by failing to 
consider the cumulative effects of the three dam projects com-
prising the Rogue River Basin Project.120 Section 1508.7 of the 
CEQ guidelines requires the Corps to evaluate the incremental 
impact of its project in light of other past, present, and reasona-
bly foreseeable actions.l2l 
While the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that a sepa-
rate EIS was required for the entire project,122 the court was 
persuaded that the Corps did not take a "hard look" at the cu-
mulative impact of the three dam project.123 In its final supple-
mental EIS, the Corps admitted that turbidity in the Rogue 
would increase as a result of the entire basin project.124 How-
ever, in concluding that fish production would not be signifi-
cantly affected by this increased turbidity, the Corps considered 
only the turbidity created by the Elk Creek Dam project.1211 Fur-
thermore, in response to a United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency comment, the Corps declared that the Elk Creek 
EIS was not the proper place to discuss the effects on down-
stream water quality of Lost Creek Dam.126 The court disagreed 
117. ld. (citing Oregon Envtl Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 495 (9th Cir. 
1987». 
118. Judge Wallace dissented from this portion of the worst case decision. Marsh, 
820 F.2d at 1062 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
119. ld. at 1059. 
120. ld. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1986). See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text. 
122. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059. The plaintiffs argued that 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) 
requires the three dam project be evaluated in a single EIS because they are part of a 
connected plan. ld. The court, however, found that the requirement of a single EIS ap-
plied only to "proposed actions." ld. Here, the other two dams were already in place. See 
supra text accompanying notes 9-10. 
123. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059-60. 
124. ld. at 1060. 
125.ld. 
126. ld. 
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with this stance to the extent that a discussion of the effects of 
Lost Creek Dam were necessary to indicate the cumulative im-
pact resulting from the Elk Creek project.127 Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Corps failed to adequately consider 
the cumulative impact of the Elk Creek project in conjunction 
with the two already completed dams; and that this inquiry 
should take place before proceeding with construction of the last 
dam.128 
B. DISSENT 
Judge Wallace dissented from the portion of the majority 
opinion requiring the Corps to issue a new supplementary 
EIS.129 The dissent applied the Stop H-3 four-factor analysis to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the Corps' decision not to supple-
ment the EIS.130 
Judge Wallace first analyzed the Oregon Department of 
Fish and Wildlife's (Department) conclusions regarding the en-
vironmental impact of the project.13l Two independent experts, 
selected by the Corps, reviewed the Department's study, as well 
as Corps experts.132 These authorities conceded that while some 
Department conclusions were valid, many were unreliable due to 
flawed methodology, statistical inaccuracy or "undue biological 
speculation."133 Relying on these comments and statements by 
the Department's program leader conceding some possible inac-
curacies, Judge Wallace argued that the Department's study was 
of dubious accuracy and therefore not significant under the first 
Stop H-3 factor.l34 
Applying the third and fourth Stop H-3 factors, Judge Wal-
lace argued that the Corps exercised a high degree of care in 
127. ld. "[T]he Corps [must] consider cumulative impacts of the proposed actions 
which supplement or aggravate the impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
actions." ld. at 1059. 
128. ld. at 1060. 
129. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 
1987) (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
130. ld. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
131. ld. at 1062-64. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
132. ld. at 1062-63. 
133. ld. 
134. ld. 
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evaluating this information and had sufficiently supported its 
decision not to supplement the EIS by communicating a formal 
response to the Department.lslI For these reasons Judge Wallace 
concluded that the Corps' decision not to supplement the EIS 
was reasonable. ISS 
Judge Wallace scrutinized the United States Soil Conserva-
tion Service's (Service) report suggesting increased turbidity in 
the Rogue resulting from construction of the dam.137 The Ser-
vice found sedimentation levels in the Elk Creek area in excess 
of those reported in the EIS.138 Though Judge Wallace consid-
ered this information accurate, he concluded it was not suffi-
ciently significant to require supplementation of the EIS.Is9 
Since the Corps could reasonably conclude that the Ser-
vice's concerns were not significant, minimal additional analysis 
would satisfy the Corps' obligation under the third Stop H-3 
factor.14o Judge Wallace noted that the Corps never specifically 
supported its decision not to supplement the EIS to address the 
Service's data, the fourth Stop H-3 factor.141 However, in con-
sideration of all the factors, the Judge concluded that the major-
ity's decision requiring the issuance of a new supplemental EIS 
addressing the Service's study was unreasonable.142 The court's 
function is not to determine the scientific validity of the Corps' 
assessments of this new information, but to determine whether 
the Corps responded reasonably to the concerns raised.14s 
135. [d. at 1064. The dissent considered that the Corps' review of the Department 
study by its own and independent specialists satisfied the third Stop H-3 factor regard-
ing the level of care exercised by an agency in response to newly acquired information. 
[d. Furthermore, the dissent considered the Corps' formal response directed to one of 
the Department's three main concerns as sufficient to satisfy its obligation to support its 
decision under the fourth Stop H-3 factor. [d. 
136. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1064 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
137. [d. 
138. Id. 
139. [d. at 1064-65. Judge Wallace pointed to considerable evidence indicating the 
lack of a direct relationship between soil type and turbidity. Id. at 1064. See supra note 
102 and accompanying text. 
140. [d. at 1064-65. Though the Corps undertook no further studies in response to 
the Service's report, the dissent argued that the Corps had good reason to conclude that 
the Service's conclusions were unfounded. [d. 
141. [d. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1065. 
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v. CRITIQUE 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, the Ninth 
Circuit appropriately concluded that the Corps' Elk Creek Dam 
EIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act.144 With 
each issue, the court analyzed the sufficiency of the Corps' pres-
entation mindful of the EIS's purpose: to promote informed de-
cision-making and informed public participation.145 By remand-
ing this case to the district court for appropriate injunctive 
relief, the Ninth Circuit took a firm step towards assuring that 
the full extent of Elk Creek Dam's environmental impact will be 
assessed before construction can resume.146 
The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the 
mitigation measures submitted violated NEPA.147 The EIS's 
summary statement of nondescript mitigation measures simply 
failed to fulfill the Corps' obligation to provide a coherent and 
effective mitigation plan.148 
Marsh, in harmony with cases reviewing comparable defi-
ciencies, recognized that the Corps' mitigation plan failed to ful-
fill its purpose.149 For example, in Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association v. Peterson,150 the Ninth Circuit rejected 
a Forest Service mitigation plan which merely listed mitigation 
measures without an evaluation of their effectiveness.lI5l Simi-
larly, in Prince George's County, Md. v. Holloway/52 the court 
rejected an EIS which failed to address measures to mitigate the 
impact of an influx of military personnel into the community.153 
In Marsh, because the mitigation measures offered were so 
144. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
145. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1054. See supr:a text accompanying notes 26-27. 
146. Id. at 1062. 
147. Id. at 1055. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. 
148. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1055. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
149. Id. A mitigation plan presented without evaluation of its effectiveness does not 
promote informed decision-making. Id. 
150 .. 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated in part on rehearing on other grounds, 
795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
151. Id. at 588. 
152. 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975), discussed supra note 39. 
153. Id. at 1186-87. 
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vague and undeveloped, evaluation of their effectiveness was im-
possible; and therefore, a violation of NEP A's procedural re-
quirements. llS4 By rejecting the Corps' minimal effort, Marsh, 
. like Northwest Indian and Prince George's County, reaffirmed 
the principle that a complete mitigation plan is a critical factor 
in judging the environmental impact of an agency's actions.llSlS 
Furthermore, little fault can be found with the court's con-
clusion that the EIS inadequately treated areas of uncertain en-
vironmental impact.llSs Here, the Corps' own data indicated un-
certainty regarding Elk Creek's water flow contribution to the 
Rogue, a key factor affecting turbidity levels.llS7 The requirement 
of a worst case analysis is necessary where, as in the present 
case, the extent of damage to the ecosystem is undetermined due 
to gaps in relevant data. llS8 In Sierra Club v. Sigler,lIS9 the Fifth 
Circuit required analysis of the effects of a hypothetical massive 
oil spill in order to fully disclose the possible environmental 
costs of a planned oil superport. ISO As in Sigler, if decision-mak-
ers and the public are to be fully informed of a project's impact, 
the full range of its environmental costs must be addressed.l6l 
In addition, the court properly held that the Corps violated 
NEP A's cumulative impact requirement.ls2 In Thomas v. Peter-
son,IS3 the Ninth Circuit struck down the Forest Service's ap-
proval of a timber harvesting project and related road construc-
tion, where the Service did not evaluate the combined 
environmental impact of the projects.lM In Marsh, the EIS 
stated that fish production from increased turbidity would not 
be adversely affected. ISIS However, this conclusion was reached 
by consideration of the turbidity resulting from the Elk Creek 
154. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1055. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. at 1059. 
157. [d. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
158. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1059. 
159. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 63-67. 
160. [d. at 974-75. 
161. See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1984), dis-
cussed supra note 68-72, where the BLM was required to analyze, in the EIS, the possi-
bility that its herbicide spraying program might cause the spread of cancer. 
162. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1060. 
163. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 79-84. 
164. [d. at 761. 
165. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1060. 
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project alone, disregarding the impact of the two other dams in 
the Rogue Basin Project.166 An EIS like the one in Marsh or in 
Thomas, which overlooks a project's actual environmental ef-
fects by considering it apart from existing conditions is incom-
plete, and serves to mislead rather than inform those who rely 
on it.167 
While these aspects of the present decision are important, 
Marsh's true significance is revealed in the court's analysis of 
the Corps' duty to supplement the EIS. In rejecting the Corps' 
decision not to supplement the EIS, the Ninth Circuit closely 
scrutinized the Corps' conduct under a reasonableness stan-
dard.16s 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the information acquired 
by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the United 
States Soil Conservation Service was environmentally signifi-
cant, despite strong disagreement by Corps experts.169 Second, 
despite similar opposition, the majority determined that "some" 
of this information was probably accurate.170 Third, even though 
Corps experts reviewed much of this information, the court held 
that the Corps failed to adequately respond to it.l7l Finally, the 
court concluded that the Corps did not offer any explanation or 
additional data to support its decision not to supplement its 
EIS, despite the Corps' position that this information did not 
merit formal response.172 
Faced with this dispute among experts regarding the signifi-
cance and accuracy of this new information, many courts would 
have upheld the Corps' decision as reasonable.173 For example, 
in Township of Springfield v. Lewis,174, the Third Circuit upheld 
an agency decision to include new environmental information in 
166. [d. 
167. [d. 
168. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1056-58. The court applied a four-factor analysis citing 
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1464 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 
(1985). 
169. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1057. See supra notes 97-106 & 132-33. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 1057-58. 
172. [d. 
173. See, e.g., Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1062 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part), supra notes 129-143 and accompanying text. 
174. 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), discussed supra notes 28 & 46. 
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its EIS after it had been circulated.l'16 The Third Circuit's vali-
dation of an agency's supplementation of significant information 
to an EIS after circulation directly contradicts the purpose of 
the EIS: to promote informed decision-making.l'16 In Wisconsin 
v. Weinberger,l'1'1 the Seventh Circuit extended itself in uphold-
ing an agency's decision by treating a Navy decision not to sup-
plement its EIS, as a decision not to issue an EIS.l'1S This tech-
nique allowed the court to apply a much less rigorous review 
of the Navy's actions, so that reversal would be virtually 
impossible. 
Marsh's significance lies in the majority's willingness to un-
dertake a probing and in-depth review of the circumstances sur-
rounding the Corps' decisions, rather than to defer to the 
agency's expertise.l'19 Disagreement among experts frequently 
occurs. Where, as here, legitimate concerns are raised regarding 
a project's environmental consequences, the Ninth Circuit prop-
erly concluded that this information should have been addressed 
in the EIS.lsO This result is further justified by the substantial 
environmental damage that the Elk Creek Project would cause: 
the irretrievable destruction of prime wilderness areas in the up-
per Rogue Valley, as well as irretrievable losses to fish and wild-
life habitat.lsl 
The immediate impact of the Ninth Circuit's decision is to 
suspend construction of the project.1S2 Compliance with the 
court's decision forces the Corps to evaluate new information 
relevant to Elk Creek's environmental impact, and to compare it 
with its own conclusions.ls3 This will increase project costs. In 
addition to the possibility that this process might reveal errors 
175. [d. at 439. 
176. Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985), 
discussed supra note 26. 
177. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), see supra note 46. 
178. [d. at 417. 
179. Despite the United States Supreme Court's advocacy of "substantial inquiry" 
of an agency's decisions by a reviewing court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), many courts are satisfied if the agency demonstrates 
that it took a "hard look" at the project's environmental consequences. Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); discussed supra note 27. 
180. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1057. 
181. [d. at 1059, see supra note 11. 
182. [d. at 1060. 
183. [d. at 1061-62. 
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or inconsistencies in the Corps' position, project opponents gain 
time to gather political strength, information and influence.I84 
Furthermore, as time passes and costs increase, assumptions re-
lating to the project's benefits may no longer remain valid. 
These factors could conceivably result in cancellation of a con-
troversial project such as Elk Creek Dam. 
In cases such as Marsh, abandonment of the project is ap-
propriate since its environmental costs far outweigh the benefits 
to be gained by the addition of a third dam in the Rogue water-
shed.I81S Substantial evidence indicates that the key factor pro-
pelling the Elk Creek project was a Congressional intent to 
channel federal largesse back to the constituency, rather than to 
realize any significant benefit to flood control.I86 
Regarding the prospective impact of the present case, 
Marsh serves as a signal to government agencies that the Ninth 
Circuit will not tolerate half-hearted efforts in the evaluation of 
the environmental effects of agency actions. Marsh indicates 
that the courts will take a "hard look" at agency decisions to 
assure that NEP A's objectives of fostering informed decision-
making and public access to relevant information are satisfied. 
Agency generation of voluminous data will not guarantee ac-
ceptance of its decisions if responsible opposing opinions are ig-
nored or required analyses are glossed over. Marsh stands for 
the proposition that the courts will accept a significant role, 
under NEP A, in ensuring that all the potential environmental 
costs of agency actions be disclosed prior to proceeding. 
Unfortunately, as indicated by many of the cases surveyed 
above, courts frequently defer to agency decisions in challenges 
184. See MURCHISON, supra note 21, at 611-13 (the information and time gained as a 
result of NEPA procedural requirements may aid in influencing an agency to abandon its 
proposal). 
185. See Oregon Natural Resources Council, White Paper (August 23, 1987) 
(presenting evidence of severe environmental effects of the project, and General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) challenges to claimed benefits of the project). Id. at 5-6. Further-
more, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service questioned whether prior forecasts of water 
storage needs supporting the project were still accurate. Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1058 n.7; see 
supra note 111. 
186. Id. at 7-8. The White Paper surveys the political historY of the Elk Creek Pro-
ject and points out the Corps' prior opposition. Id. 
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to the sufficiency of an EIS.187 CEQ guidelines however, as uti-
lized in Marsh, provide important support for the requirement 
of full environmental disclosure. Nevertheless, the essential solu-: 
tion to the environmental issues presented in Marsh require fur-
ther legislation at the federal level to prevent the needless de-
struction of our natural resources. Congress must recognize that 
retention of rapidly disappearing wilderness areas and wildlife 
habitat require preference in the evaluation of whether to pro-
ceed with planned development. However, as long as projects 
like Elk Creek provide a popular device to channel federal funds 
back to one's constituency, those interested in protecting the en-
vironment can not hope for significant Congressional action in 
the near future. . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Marsh is a victory for those who seek to limit the develop-
ment and destruction of our natural resources. However, since 
this victory may only result in the temporary postponement of 
the Elk Creek project, it should not cause euphoria. While 
Marsh demonstrates that the courts will support the policies un-
derlying the National Environmental Policy Act, only by further 
legislation insuring preference to environmental concerns can 
our natural resources be adequately protected from unnecessary 
development. 
James J. Wesser* 
187. See e.g., Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), supra notes 29-34 and 
accompanying text; Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1108 (1985), supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; Druid Hills Civic Ass'n 
v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), supra note 28; Township of 
Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1983), supra note 28; Wisconsin v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984), supra note 46. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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